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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) 
Johnson Space Center (JSC) Safety and Mission Assurance 
(S&MA) uses two human reliability analysis (HRA) 
methodologies. The first is a simplified method which is based 
on how much time is available to complete the action, with 
consideration included for environmental and personal factors 
that could influence the human’s reliability. This method is 
expected to provide a conservative value or placeholder as a 
preliminary estimate. This preliminary estimate or screening 
value is used to determine which placeholder needs a more 
detailed assessment. The second methodology is used to 
develop a more detailed human reliability assessment on the 
performance of critical human actions. This assessment needs 
to consider more than the time available, this would include 
factors such as:  the importance of the action, the context, 
environmental factors, potential human stresses, previous 
experience, training, physical design interfaces, available 
procedures/checklists and internal human stresses. The more 
detailed assessment is expected to be more realistic than that 
based primarily on time available.   
When performing an HRA on a system or process that has an 
operational history, we have information specific to the task 
based on this history and experience. In the case of a 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) that is based on a new 
design and has no operational history, providing a “reasonable” 
assessment of potential crew actions becomes more 
challenging.   
To determine what is expected of future operational parameters, 
the experience from individuals who had relevant experience 
and were familiar with the system and process previously 
implemented by NASA was used to provide the “best” available 
data.  Personnel from Flight Operations, Flight Directors, 
Launch Test Directors, Control Room Console Operators, and 
Astronauts were all interviewed to provide a comprehensive 
picture of previous NASA operations.  Verification of the 
assumptions and expectations expressed in the assessments will 
be needed when the procedures, flight rules, and operational 
requirements are developed and then finalized. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
NASA has been a pioneer in space since its inception and is 
committed to managing the risks inherent in developing and 
employing new technology in space. Early implementation of 
risk reviews and assessments (including: Hazards Analyses, 
FMEA, PRA, HRA, design reviews, et.al.) in the design phase 
is intended to improve safety and reduce costly re-works by 
finding major risk contributors that can be eliminated or 
mitigated early in the process. However, there are challenges in 
implementing methodologies originally intended to assess the 
risk profile for a completed functional operation. 
During the process of performing a PRA, the actions of humans 
associated with the systems and equipment failures are often 
identified late in the process. Having sufficient information 
available to determine the potential risks of human errors 
associated with these failures is generally based on a 
combination of information available, experience, judgment 
and assumptions. The less information available to perform an 
assessment, the greater reliance on using assumptions to 
supplement the information needed to arrive at a reasonable 
evaluation of risk. 
2   THE PAST – SHUTTLE PROGRAM (1981-2011) 
NASA has experience with manned spaceflight since its’ first 
manned mission in 1961. The wealth of knowledge and 
experience culminating with the Shuttle program and current 
International Space Station (ISS) operations provides NASA 
with a unique position of having over 50 years of experience 
with getting humans to space and exploring there. This also 
provides NASA with a proven track record for: 
 Developing training programs (crew, console, 
operations and ground support) 
 Implementing consistent process and program 
reviews and technical assessments 
 Developing assessment criteria and methods to 
analyze and assess capabilities and safety 
 Providing information and support before, during and 
after a mission 
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2.1 History 
By the end of the Shuttle program, common practice for NASA 
programs and missions was to perform extensive pre-planning 
and training of crew and control console operators prior to 
flight. Extensive mission planning for training requirements, 
qualification requirements, simulator experience, process 
development, procedures and flight rules was completed and 
implemented after being thoroughly vetted by NASA Launch 
and Flight Operations. These tasks were performed years before 
the first flight and routinely updated as flights occurred. This 
resulted in Crew and console operators having predetermined, 
well defined roles and actions governed by procedures, 
checklists and flight rules.   
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA) were introduced into the NASA culture in the 
late 1980s [1]. The Shuttle PRA/HRA was a living analysis with 
multiple iterations to assess and document the design changes, 
system modifications, new assessments and other changes that 
occurred during the life of the program. The PRA was 
developed and subsequent changes made following the 
guidelines set out in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Guide 
for NASA Managers [2] and provided the basis for the 
methodology used and application of the concepts for use in 
assessing human reliability for NASA missions [3]. The 
concepts used to develop the methodology were based on the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Technique for 
Human Error Reliability Prediction (THERP) methodology [4] 
for the basic screening process and Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis Method (CREAM) [5] for the more detailed 
assessments. These generic concepts were adapted to better 
reflect the differences inherent in NASA missions and 
capabilities. These practices were also augmented to reflect the 
uniqueness of the Shuttle program [6]. 
2.2 Overview of the HRA Process:   
HRA is used to identify and quantify Human Error Probability 
(HEP) events based on the design and operation of the space 
craft and launch support capabilities. The information is 
provided to design and operations personnel for use in 
identification of ways to eliminate, mitigate or reduce the 
calculated HEP. The assessment is intended to describe, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, the probability of human errors 
which could cause system or operational failure. By performing 
these assessments which model human actions with their 
corresponding failure in a PRA, a more complete picture of the 
risk and risk contributions can be shown.   
The first step in the process is to review the human actions and 
interactions needed to perform the task. For screening purposes, 
a matrix of “Time Available” versus “Performance Conditions” 
is used to identify a generic (or screening) risk value. The 
screening values should be conservative. The HRA performed 
will continue to evolve as additional information regarding time 
available, design specifics, training requirements, 
environmental conditions, stress, complexity of actions, 
familiarity with tasks and other associated factors becomes 
available. This is an iterative and collaborative process which 
continues throughout the program life. The overall probability 
of failure is based on a combination of human errors needed to 
produce a failed task and the probability that the individual will 
commit these errors.    
Figure 1 provides a simplified flowchart of the process NASA 
JSC S&MA uses to perform a quick and conservative screening 
assessment of identified human errors which will later be 
followed by a more detailed assessment of those human actions 
that are higher risk contributors to the overall risk for crew or 
mission. Using an initial screening technique provides a quicker 
turn-around time for an initial assessment and a more efficient 
use of resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
Figure 1   Simplified Flowchart of NASA HRA Process 
An overview of the methods used to perform a “screening” 
assessment and a more “detailed” assessment are described 
below.    
2.3  Screening/Simplified Methodology 
The majority of human actions identified as having the potential 
to contribute to defined failure criteria for Loss of Crew (LOC) 
or Loss of Mission (LOM) metrics, are initially quantified with 
an analysis methodology that is based on THERP, as described 
in the Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis 
on Nuclear Power Plant Applications, NUREG/CR-1278 (4). 
For screening purposes, a matrix of “Time Available” versus 
“Performance Conditions” is used to identify a generic (or 
screening) risk value. The screening values are expected to 
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provide a relatively quick and conservative method to identify 
risk-dominant human errors. The goal of a screening evaluation 
is to identify high risk actions or activities and determine human 
error risk contributions. The task analysis involves identifying 
the steps of the procedure and assessing the probability that a 
step may be incorrectly carried out, or identifying erroneous 
actions that can directly lead to LOC or LOM. Using an initial 
screening analysis should provide a relatively quick and 
inherently conservative value so that lack of detailed modeling 
does not lead to underestimation of the risk. 
Types of human actions modeled include those required for 
normal operation of a system. In general, recoveries and work-
arounds are only modeled if the scenario becomes dominant in 
the risk profile. Recovery actions modeled would only include 
those actions that if not performed correctly could directly 
contribute to LOC/LOM. 
Screening methodology based on modified THERP are used for 
the initial assessments based on the following considerations:    
 Limited human interaction and tasks, less complex 
situations or more benign failure results 
 Uses less detailed information  
 Time to complete 
 Task complexity 
 Environmental factors, stress, familiarity, etc. 
 Uncertainty  
2.4  Detailed Methodology 
A more detailed assessment provides a better understanding of 
which elements cause or contribute to the identified risk of 
human error; providing a basis for validating the risk and 
potentially influence future actions to eliminate or mitigate the 
risk.   Human errors that are large risk contributors to overall 
failure are evaluated using a version of the methodology 
described in CREAM [5]. These assessments are generally 
performed when sufficient information is available. 
CREAM, developed by Erik Hollnagel, expands on THERP by 
considering the effects of performance assessment shaping 
factors such as: 
• Effectiveness of procedures for limiting or 
encouraging errors 
• Familiarity and experience with process, procedures 
and equipment 
• How the environment affects the potential for human 
errors to occur 
• How personnel physical and mental stresses affect 
performance 
• How personnel react as complexity increases 
The technique described in the book was modified to include 
aspects from THERP regarding dependency and uncertainty 
models since CREAM did not address those areas. Using a 
modified CREAM methodology provided more precise human 
error probability estimates using more specific task data and 
detailed task analysis.  This modified CREAM based method 
was used for the Shuttle PRA. 
 
2.5 Why this worked for Shuttle 
When the initial HRA assessments were performed for the 
Shuttle program, there was a wealth of knowledge and 
experience documented in the lessons learned, operating 
experience, incident reports, flight rules, crew task analysis 
documents, process documentation, training records and 
operating procedures. Having information from years of 
experience introduced a large amount of material on crew tasks 
to review, with the understanding that only a few would 
eventually be identified as major risk contributors. The two step 
methodology was selected to fit the need. This process used the 
quicker and less resource intensive initial screening evaluation 
followed by a more detailed analysis, which was only 
performed as needed, providing an effective use of resources 
without compromising the final product value. 
3 The Present:  Orion Vehicle (2016) 
In general, HRA is performed on existing processes and 
equipment. This means that the information used to develop the 
assessment is based on equipment that exists, and has detailed 
designs and schematics available, as well as real world 
experience regarding human actions and interactions. 
Procedures and processes are available and often have been in 
effect for some time. Training, lessons learned, previous errors, 
and problems affecting human reliability are available and can 
be accessed. 
Performing an assessment of human error for a project or 
program in the design phase provides a host of challenges since 
the program is expected to continue to evolve as additional 
information regarding time available, design specifics, training 
requirements, environmental conditions, stress, complexity of 
actions, familiarity with tasks and other associated factors 
evolve throughout program development and implementation. 
This is an iterative and collaborative process where some 
aspects can become very fluid. Even with these types of 
challenges, performing a PRA/HRA during the design phase 
can provide valuable information on potential areas for 
improving the risk profiles before design changes become more 
costly. Early use of these risk methodologies can provide 
Program management with additional information regarding 
risk and risk drivers during different design and production 
stages which can influence changes that clarify or reduce risks 
and add to the information available for management decisions 
regarding design and operational changes. The PRA can also be 
used to determine if the program is meeting risk based 
requirements. 
  
 
3.1 Current Situation – Critical Design Phase 
Initial PRAs for the various elements of the Orion program are 
performed years prior to actual mission launch. There is limited 
information available to use in performing a human event 
assessment during the design phase. Early program 
documentation can include:  preliminary design information, 
mission requirement documents, and design requirement 
documents.  Information available from previous human space 
programs includes: previously documented operational 
experience, previous knowledge and understanding of ground 
personnel support and crew experience.   
Identifying the human actions that can lead to failure under 
identified failure scenario conditions is challenging, given the 
lack of physical systems, procedure, flight rules, displays and 
control equipment which do not exist in early design phases.  
The PRA in these early stages is based on identified failure 
scenarios. Assumptions made for these failure scenarios 
identify if human actions are needed to support success.  
Identifying how humans can cause failures under the myriad of 
variables at this point is more difficult. 
The results from these human error assessments can provide 
input to determine overall project risk, and assess resulting risk 
severity. The results of these preliminary assessments are 
intended to be conservative values which incorporate 
uncertainty involved with attempting to predict potential events 
and scenario development with notional information. 
3.2 Using NASA Program and Organizational 
Experience 
Although designs and technology can change radically, basic 
human tasks and actions, and the conditions surrounding their 
performance are unlikely to change if the organizational 
processes and policies are the same. Assuming this concept as 
the starting point, the analyst can predict the most likely human 
actions and human reliability for a similar scenario.    
Since NASA has been performing launches and operating space 
vehicles for years, it is reasonable to use previous NASA 
programs and performance to predict NASA personnel training 
and reactions during similar situations or scenarios. NASA’s 
approach for mission preparation includes a thorough review of 
all design information, studies, and assessments by operations 
and support staff to identify crew activities and necessary 
actions well before mission specific training begins.  
Identification and completion of plans and procedures for 
normal operations and contingency plans and procedures for 
potential problems and failure scenarios are developed for crew 
use in training and during the mission. For unidentified 
scenarios that arise during the mission, the ground support staff 
assesses the situation and provides plans and guidance to 
address the problem. Organizational support for the crew 
includes teams of experienced, effective and knowledgeable 
individuals who can cover any questions related to design, 
operations and anticipated crew environment and conditions.  
Support and monitoring is available continuously, with experts 
on call.   
Many of the conditions that may affect crew performance have 
been experienced before by previous crews. These would 
include: ascent and descent G-forces, weightlessness 
(movement, tools, materials), limited space, life support 
requirements (heat, cold, air, water, etc.), maintenance and 
monitoring tasks, spacesuit/flight suits, communications 
equipment, emergency exit conditions, limited access to 
equipment or components, visors restricting vision, deluge 
during emergency egress, waiting for recovery after landing, 
etc. Although each mission phase has different working 
conditions to address, general situations and conditions will be 
similar to past experience even though the specific initiating 
events may differ. 
NASA astronauts have a shared background of training, studies 
and mission preparation. Specific crew members are selected 
for their ability to work together, and have trained together for 
a year or more prior to any mission. Support personnel include 
teams of experienced, effective and knowledgeable individuals 
who provide a cohesive support team for each mission.   
Since this is an exceedingly specialized group of individuals in 
a highly regimented environment, future operations are not 
expected to fundamentally change how people perform under 
the stated conditions. Our solution has been to consider using 
the years of previous experience that NASA has for crewed 
vehicle operations, and assume that future training, processes, 
procedures and operations will conform to the same rigorous 
standards and be equally effective during future operations.  For 
normal operations, planning prior to a mission should have 
identified processes and procedures for situations.   
3.3 Performing the Assessment 
For a predictive HRA, certain basic assumptions are needed as 
a starting point. These include the assumption that adequate 
planning for operations, procedures, and human factors designs 
(displays and controls, spacesuits and other equipment) have 
been performed and cover known situations adequately. Also, 
that crew and operations personnel actions and activities have 
been identified and rigorously reviewed to ensure that adequate 
planning has occurred for crew safety and mission success. 
Based on past performance, the assumption that NASA 
personnel are extensively trained and adequately prepared for 
the tasks expected of them can also be made. The same 
methodology developed during the Shuttle program (as well as 
Apollo) and adapted as needed in the program design phase, is 
used in the human reliability assessments during the different 
phases of the current Orion program, including the use of an 
  
initial screening assessment followed by a more detailed 
assessment for higher risk contributors. 
3.3.1 Screening Assessment 
In the case of the Shuttle program, the intent was to review 
human actions performed to determine which actions 
contributed to safety and mission risk, and to what extent.  
Although the number of tasks to review was large, these tasks 
were specific and documented. Trying to identify all 
possibilities for human error during a mission during the design 
phase is neither productive nor realistic. Given the generic 
nature of the failure scenarios, a variety of potential actions can 
be postulated that could affect failure risk. Many of these could 
be eliminated based on specific equipment design, adequate 
training or during procedure development. Therefore, the focus 
is narrowed to those actions that are integral to the failure 
scenario which can be identified in early risk assessments. 
These encompass only the specific task or action that a human 
must perform to achieve success in the postulated failure 
scenario. The result identifies fewer human error events for 
inclusion at this early stage of the program.   
The methodology used for this screening assessment is based 
on THERP which accounts for variable factors such as time 
available, dependency and working conditions. This type of 
screening assessment allows an analyst to provide a HEP based 
on less detailed information in a shorter period of time.  
However, the HEPs tend to be more conservative and may not 
accurately identify the risk due to the lack of information 
available for the assessment. 
3.3.2 Detailed Assessment 
For this phase, human error events identified as major risk 
drivers are considered in more depth, and a detailed assessment 
is performed using details provided by “domain” experts.  
Additional information is gained through interviews with 
subject matter experts (Astronauts, Flight Operations, systems 
analysts, etc.) for specific failure scenarios to identify cognitive 
functions for tasks and Common Performance Conditions 
(CPCs), also called Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs), 
which affect human performance. Based on scenario 
development, the CPCs may be different for each task or action 
performed.  These CPCs show the influence (positively or 
negatively) to the risk of human error for the defined task under 
these defined conditions. A value for “nominal” generic 
conditions is used as a starting point, and is transformed into a 
value associated with a particular task or action using nine 
CPCs.  
These CPCs are based on those described in Reference 5 and 
include: Adequacy of Organization, Working Conditions, 
Adequacy of Man-Machine Interface (MMI) & Operational 
Support, Availability of Procedures/Plans, Number of 
Simultaneous Goals, Available Time, Time of Day (Circadian 
rhythm), Adequacy of training & Preparation and Crew 
Collaboration Quality. For identified human error events, this 
is an iterative process as additional information is developed 
and available. 
4 The Future – Challenges and Solutions 
In order to provide a “reasonable” assessment, assumptions are 
made based on previous NASA programs and performance, as 
well as current program documents and requirements. Using the 
same PRA assumption that these are “mature” flight estimates, 
implies all planning, process and procedures would have been 
thoroughly vetted and revised to perform as desired. Changes 
to design, policy, procedures and training should be generated 
based on the assessments to lower the risk of occurrence of 
human errors. These types of changes can assist in lowering the 
potential error or failures resulting from human actions in the 
final design.   
HRA development during preliminary design and reviews need 
to address the following challenges: 
Problem Why this a 
problem 
 
Solution Acceptability 
 
Available 
Information 
 
Concept and 
requirement 
documents allow 
multiple paths for 
success and limits 
available specifics. 
Using past 
experience 
For the areas 
identified, it is 
unlikely that NASA 
operations will 
change what years 
of development and 
experience have 
shown as effective.  
Identify 
potential 
failure 
significant 
human error  
Multiple ways to 
cause failure based 
on many different 
permutations of 
events (too many 
“what ifs”). 
Using past 
experience 
identify 
single 
action that 
would 
cause 
failure. 
At this point in 
program, the risk 
values are high level 
estimates, so using 
the human action 
that must occur for 
success or failure 
provides a 
reasonable estimate. 
Manpower/ 
Resources 
 
Always limited. Screening 
vs. detailed 
Concentrating on 
high risk 
contributors is more 
effective use. 
Assumptions 
 
 Consistency 
between 
programs 
 Reasonableness 
 Most probable 
development of 
events 
Using past 
experience 
Provides basis for 
rationale and results.  
How 
conservative 
 
Major risk 
contributors need to 
be defensible to 
ensure resources 
versus reward 
Screening 
vs. detailed 
Each method  
provides 
conservative risk 
estimates. 
Using the 
Results 
 
Interpretation. Integrate 
into 
program 
reviews. 
Inform management 
and reviewers of 
potential risk 
concerns. 
Table 1 Summary of Challenges and Potential Solutions 
 
  
This is a starting point and is expected to evolve through a 
number of iterations as the project matures and changes. The 
use of assumptions and surrogate data provides a place to start, 
but can only be proven correct or appropriate as assumptions 
become reality. Any changes or modifications in design, 
process or procedure can affect the results of an assessment. 
These rationales are based on NASA’s unique history and 
experience and some aspects may not apply to other industries. 
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